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The ability to perform computations on encrypted data is a powerful tool for protecting a client’s privacy,
especially in today’s era of cloud and distributed computing. In terms of privacy, the best solutions that classical
techniques can achieve are unfortunately not unconditionally secure in the sense that they are dependent on a
hacker’s computational power. Here we theoretically investigate, and experimentally demonstrate with Gaussian
displacement and squeezing operations, a quantum solution that achieves the unconditional security of a user’s
privacy using the practical technology of continuous variables. We demonstrate losses of up to 10 km both ways
between the client and the server and show that security can still be achieved. Our approach offers a number of
practical benefits, which can ultimately allow for the potential widespread adoption of this quantum technology
in future cloud-based computing networks.
INTRODUCTION
Incredibly, 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are produced in the
world every single day. In fact, it has been estimated that over
90% of the world’s data was created in the last two years [1].
Most of this data is stored around the world in data centers
and accessed remotely via the cloud. Because cloud comput-
ing is operated by third parties (e.g., Amazon, Facebook), one
of the outcomes of this acceleration in information is the need
to better protect our privacy. In principle, the cloud contains
various types of data for which security and privacy are es-
sential. For example, an individual’s personal data (such as
medical records and credit card information), the trade se-
crets and intellectual property of multinational corporations,
and sensitive government information (e.g., the CIA bought
cloud space from Amazon). Therefore securing a client’s pri-
vacy in the cloud is one of the core security challenges we face
today.
One of the current solutions to this challenge is homomor-
phic encryption [2]. The requirement for such a solution was
first identified in the 1970’s by Rivest and colleagues [3]. It
was not until over 30 years later that IBM researcher Craig
Gentry discovered fully homomorphic encryption [4]. Al-
though there has been much progress in recent years, the best
known implementations of fully homomorphic encryption are
impractical for today’s computers [2, 5–7].
It is interesting when one considers the generalization of
homomorphic encryption to the quantum realm. If one re-
stricts the class of quantum operations to be implemented,
then it was shown one can hide up to a constant fraction,
which can be made arbitrarily close to unity, of the encrypted
information while only requiring polynomial overhead [8].
Unfortunately, it has been shown that, perfectly secure, de-
terministic fully homomorphic quantum computation is only
possible at the expense of an exponential overhead [9]. One
can relax the requirements of quantum homomorphic en-
cryption by allowing further rounds of interaction between
the client and server. Such a scheme was first studied by
Childs [10] where he outlined a protocol to allow an individ-
ual of limited quantum ability (a client) to delegate a quantum
computation to another person (a server) who is in possession
of a fully-fledged quantum computer. The idea here being
that such a computer is only initially available to a select few.
Progress towards this direction was demonstrated recently by
IBM who made available a small (5 qubit) quantum computer
for access in the cloud [11]. The crux of the issue in devel-
oping such a protocol lies in the fact that the client wants to
hide some subset of: her input, the quantum program, and the
final result. That such a scheme is even possible is astound-
ing from a classical viewpoint. Seminal work by Broadbent
et al. [12] built upon this idea, in the cluster-state framework
[13], to develop the notion of universal blind quantum com-
puting; a protocol which fulfils all three of the above criteria
and requires only that the client is able to prepare and send
single qubits from a finite set.
In this paper, we offer a new and novel approach to quan-
tum computing on encrypted data, that does not require chal-
lenging single photon sources or single photon detectors and
is based on a different type of substrate, known as continuous
variables [14, 15]. Continuous variables (CVs) offer a number
of practical advantages over its qubit counterpart: determinis-
tic gate implementation, low-cost and affordability of compo-
nents (such as laser sources and detectors), high detection ef-
ficiencies, high-rate of information transfer, and the ability to
be fully integrated within current telecommunication infras-
tructures. Here, we answer the questions of how limited the
client’s quantum capacity can be, how much classical com-
munication is required between the client and server, and how
many classical/quantum operations are needed per gate. Fur-
thermore, we provide proof-of-principle experimental results
which highlight the effect of loss over 10 km of effective loss.
Our protocol for computing on encrypted CVs consists of
three stages (cf. Fig. 1): an encryption stage, a program stage
and a decryption stage. We will now elaborate in more de-
tail. First, the client performs an encryption operation on their
desired input to limit the amount of information the server
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FIG. 1: Protocol for quantum computing on encrypted data. In-
put: A displaced vacuum state is prepared. Encryption: A random
displacement is applied to the initial state as an encryption proce-
dure. Channel: The state is transmitted over a Gaussian lossy channel
to the server (transmission t). Gate: The server applies the desired
(Gaussian displacement or squeezing) unitary. Channel: The state is
sent back over the Gaussian lossy channel to the client. Decryption:
The client applies a decryption operation to retrieve the final output
state.
can obtain about the initial state. The state is then sent to the
server, who performs a predetermined set of gates known to
both parties (corresponding to the program needed to be per-
formed). Finally, the state is sent back to the client who is able
to perform a decryption operation which recovers the output
of the desired computation.
To discuss the encryption operation we first define the
Heisenberg-Weyl operators [15] X(Q) = exp(−iQpˆ) and
Z(P ) = exp(iP qˆ), as well as the displacement operator
D(α) = exp(αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) where qˆ, pˆ are the canonical am-
plitude and phase operators, respectively, which obey Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty relation [qˆ, pˆ] = i. The annihilation and
creation operators are denoted by aˆ, aˆ† respectively, and are
defined by aˆ = (qˆ + ipˆ)/
√
2 and its adjoint. Consider the ac-
tion of applying a random displacement in phase-space to the
input state; intuitively speaking, if the displacement is chosen
randomly then the state will look mixed and smeared out over
all of phase-space to somebody unaware of the displacement
parameters. This can be made rigorous by invoking the fact
that 1pi
∫
D(α)|ψ〉〈ψ|D†(α)d2α = 1 holds for any normal-
ized state |ψ〉. This shows us that averaging the displacements
applied to any normalized state, over the entire complex plane,
results in a quantity proportional to the identity. In reality, a
uniform distribution of displacements over R2 is unphysical
and we must replace this with a function which dies off suffi-
ciently fast in order to adhere to some energy threshold. For
a fixed energy, a Gaussian distribution will maximize the en-
tropy of the resulting state [16] and thus we restrict ourselves
to Gaussian distributions. This will potentially give the server
the capability of extracting some information about the input
state, but the amount will be bounded based on the width of
the Gaussian. A formal security analysis of our protocol, in
the limit of finite squeezing and displacements, remains an
open problem.
We now turn our attention to the server who is asked
to perform some known algorithm on the encrypted data,
where in principle, the algorithm corresponds to a univer-
sal quantum computation. To show that the server can per-
form such a computation, it suffices to show that we can
implement a universal set of gates. Namely, we need to
show that the set G = {X(Q), Z(P ), U2(T ), U3(T ), F, CZ}
where Uk(T ) = exp(iT qˆk), F = exp
[
ipi
4
(
qˆ2 + pˆ2
)]
, and
CZ = exp(iqˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2) can be implemented and decrypted with
an appropriately chosen operation. Note that of the gates in
this set only the U3(T ) gate [17, 18] is not Gaussian, and we
only require this one non-Gaussian gate in order to achieve
universal quantum computation [19]. However, it is prudent
to note that non-Gaussian operations are very challenging to
implement and that there remain many challenges in devis-
ing a robust quantum computer based on continuous variables
[19]. Except for U3, all of these operations have decryption
Gate Correction
Z(T ) X(−Q)Z(−P )
X(T ) X(−Q)Z(−P )
U2(T ) X(−Q)Z(−2QT − P )
U3(T ) X(−Q)Z(3Q2T − P )U2(−3QT )
F X(P )Z(−Q)
CZ X1(−Q1)Z1(−Q2 − P1)⊗X2(−Q2)Z2(−Q1 − P2)
TABLE I: The decryption operations corresponding to each gate, up
to a phase, for the encryption operation D(Q,P ) for single mode
gates and D1(Q1, P1)D2(Q2, P2) for two-mode gates.
operators that correspond to displacements (cf. Table I), and
this allows for the straightforward composition of gates. To
make it clearer we consider a simple example, namely the
Z(S) gate. The encryption operation D(Q,P ) consists of a
translation in both the amplitude and phase quadratures and
it can be decomposed as a sequence of an X(Q) as well as a
Z(P ) gate, the latter commutes with Z(S) and so will simply
slide through the gate. Consider the application of the X(Q)
gate; this gate slides through the Z(S) gate up to a phase as
X(Q)Z(S) = e−iQSZ(S)X(Q). Thus we can construct a
decryption operation as
Z(S)D(Q,P ) = C†(Q,P, S)Z(S), (1)
where C(Q,P, S) = exp[i(QP/2 − QS)]X(−Q)Z(−P ) is
the decryption gate which, when applied, will undo the ef-
fect of the initial encryption operation. However, the U2 de-
cryption gate present in the U3 operation does not easily slide
through the Fourier gate F , and thus we must have the server
correct for this on-the-fly; this is possible in a manner simi-
lar to the discrete-variable protocol presented in Ref. [20]. To
perform U3(T ) the client instead sends the server two modes,
the first of which is the encrypted state and the second being
the state U2(A)Z(Q′)|0〉p, where A,Q′ are chosen randomly
and |0〉p denotes a momentum eigenstate; finite squeezing
does not present any issues other than the ones normally as-
sociated with teleportation, namely the introduction of extra
Gaussian noise [21]. The server is then able to implement
3U3(T ) as shown in the circuit below.
D(Q,P )|ψ〉 F †U3(T ) • pˆ = m1
U2(A)Z(Q
′)|0〉p • D(Q′′, P ′′) U2(B)
After the client sends both modes, and the value of B, the
server performs the desired U3(T ) gate, after application of
the inverse Fourier gate, before interacting the two modes
with a controlled phase gate, indicated by the vertical line.
The server then measures the first mode and after perform-
ing the U2(B) gate obtains the desired state U3(T )|ψ〉 on
the remaining mode, up to displacement corrections, provided
that A + B = −3QT . Note that these additional corrections
depend on the value m1A and so the server must communi-
cate the value of m1 obtained to the client, thus requiring one
round of classical communication for the full implementation.
We discuss the implementation of this protocol in more de-
tail in the supplementary material, including a discussion of
the decryption operations for each gate in the universal set,
how to compose gates, the effects of transmission and imper-
fect encryption, an entanglement-based analogue, the use of
channel estimation and limitations on squeezing.
EXPERIMENT
The CV quantum gates associated with linear phase space
displacements and squeezing transformations allow for an
experimental test of quantum computing on encrypted data
solely based on Gaussian quantum states and Gaussian oper-
ations. Such operations can be performed with high fidelity
within the field of CV quantum optics. In the following, we
thus use Gaussian displacement and squeezing operations to
test the basic principles of quantum computing on encrypted
data, i.e. we implement a server performing firstly Z and X
gates and secondly a squeezing gate, related to the U2 gate.
We start by testing the effectiveness of the encryption op-
eration by using the experimental setup shown in Fig. 2a.
Quantum information at the location of the client was gen-
erated in the form of a coherent state of light |φ〉 = |α〉.
To test the protocol for many different coherent state ex-
citations simultaneously, we produced an ensemble of co-
herent states by means of a set of electro-optical mod-
ulators (EOMs), thereby preparing the Gaussian ensem-
ble ρ =
∫
Gin(Q,P )D(Q,P )|0〉〈0|D†(Q,P )dQdP where
Gin(Q,P ) is a Gaussian probability density function with
variance Vin. This information was then encrypted by apply-
ing a randomized phase space displacement onto the coher-
ent state ensemble using the same two EOMs driven by two
independent Gaussian white noise sources with equal vari-
ances VQ = VP = Venc for the amplitude (Q) and phase
(P ) quadratures. This encryption noise results in an encrypted
state ρ =
∫
Gtot(Q,P )D(Q,P )|0〉〈0|D(Q,P )†dQdP where
Gtot(Q,P ) is a Gaussian distribution with a total variance of
Vin + Venc. We measured the encrypted quantum states with
homodyne detection, and recorded the correlations between
the measurements and the input signal. Using these correla-
tions we calculate the mutual information as plotted in Fig. 2b.
The solid line is a theoretical prediction given by
I(serverenc :clientin) =
1
2
ln
(
1 +
Vin
Venc
)
. (2)
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FIG. 2: Effectiveness of encryption. (a) Experimental setup using
electro-optical amplitude (AM) and phase (PM) modulators driven
by Gaussian white noise sources to generate ensembles of encrypted
coherent states. Both the input noise and the homodyne output
were demodulated at 10.5 MHz and recorded by a data acquisition
system (DAQ). PD: Photo Detectors. (b) The mutual information
I(serverenc :clientin) for a coherent state chosen according to a Gaus-
sian alphabet with variance Vin = 0.6 shot noise units (SNU), which
is then encrypted with a varied encryption variance Venc. For a fixed
distribution of input states the plot shows how an increased encryp-
tion noise decreases the server’s knowledge of the inputs. Error bars
are smaller than the point size.
For efficient encryption, the quadrature correlations and,
thus, the mutual information between the encrypted state re-
ceived by the server and the input state prepared by the client
should be vanishingly small. From the plot, we clearly see the
effects of a finite encryption variance.
We first implement theZ andX displacement gates as illus-
trated in Fig. 3a. The protocol was performed with a Gaussian
alphabet of coherent states with variance Vin = 0.28 shot-
noise units (SNU) embedded in encryption noise of Venc = 31
SNU. For this particular encryption the mutual information is
I = 0.005 bits/use. The Z, X gates were tested for a sym-
metric Gaussian distribution of displacements with variance
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FIG. 3: Server implementing Z and X gates. (a) Experimental setup. Ensembles of encrypted input states were generated by two electro-
optical modulators driven by two Gaussian white noise sources. The encrypted quantum states were then sent to the server through a channel
with transmittivity T simulated by a half-wave plate and a polarizing beam splitter. The server performed ensembles of displacements by using
a second pair of modulators driven by independent Gaussian white noise generators. After sending the quantum state back to the client the
output of the quantum computer was decrypted by applying phase shifted modulations using the encryption noise only known to the client.
(b) The signal-to-noise ratios of the phase quadrature measured by homodyne detection behind each stage of the protocol. An ensemble of
coherent input states and gate displacements were used and the transmissivity of the channels was set to 1. The output of the homodyne
detector was recorded by a spectrum analyzer measuring zero-span around 10.5 MHz with a resolution bandwidth of 300 kHz and a video
bandwidth of 30 Hz. A small input state was prepared (red) and subsequently encrypted (green). Then a small displacement was performed
by the server (yellow), acting as the gate. Afterwards the state was returned to the client for decryption (blue) which yields the output of the
quantum computation. For comparison we have recorded the outcome without encrypting the input (upper trace). The difference between these
is indicative of the loss for signal-to-noise ratio from imperfect decryption. (c) Fidelities between the output state ensembles using quantum
computation on encrypted states and using quantum computation on plain-text states versus the channel transmission T . Statistical error bars
smaller than the point size. The variation in the fidelities comes mainly from systematic errors in the fine tuning of the phase and gain settings
of the decryption noise for optimal decryption.
Vgate = 0.6 SNU. This results in the state ρ after the computa-
tion having a total variance of Vgate + Vin + Venc.
Finally, the state is sent back through a lossy channel to
the client who is decrypting the state using two EOMs driven
by noise which was optimally anti-correlated with the noise
used for encryption. The final state is then ideally given by
D(Q,P )|φ〉, but due to imperfections there is some residual
noise from the encryption protocol and thus we must consider
the output state ρ with a variance of Vin + Vgate + Vres. For the
presented measurement the residual noise was Vres = 0.072
SNU. To visualize the evolution of the information content at
different stages of the scheme, in Fig. 3b, we plot the signal-
to-noise-ratios (SNRs) of a single quadrature after each stage
of the protocol. It is clear from these numbers that the amount
of information in the encrypted state is close to zero, and that
the decryption operation is almost ideal. For further quantifi-
cation we show in Fig. 3c the fidelity between the ensembles
of output states of the quantum computation using encrypted
states and plain-text states. The fidelities are above 97 % for
all measured transmission values.
We now turn to the implementation of the squeezing gate
which is defined as S(r) = exp(r(aˆ2 − aˆ†2)/2), where r is
the squeezing parameter. It is directly related to the U2(T )
gate by two additional phase shifts and a suitable transforma-
tion between T and r [22], see the supplementary material for
a full justification. Figure 4a shows the experimental setup.
In contrast to the implementation of the displacement gates
we used a single coherent excitation rather than ensembles of
coherent input states. The squeezed-light source was based
on parametric down-conversion in a potassium titanyl phos-
phate crystal placed in a linear cavity. In our realization of
the gate we directly squeezed the (encrypted) input state in
the squeezed-light source. We note that this constitutes the
first demonstration of an in-line squeezing transformation of
quantum information. Previous demonstrations have relied on
off-line squeezed states [22]. A full Wigner function illustra-
tion is presented in Figs. 4c-f measured by homodyne detec-
tion after each of the four steps. The state after the squeezing
gate is shown in Fig. 4e, and it is clear that the squeezing op-
eration is hardly visible as a result of the encryption noise.
Finally, the transformed state is decrypted through displace-
ments at the client, thereby revealing the output state of the
server which is displayed in Fig. 4f. The squeezing transfor-
mations of the first and second moments of the state are now
clearly visible.
We quantify the performance of the squeezing protocol on
encrypted data by computing the fidelity between the state re-
trieved by the client after decrypting the computed input state
and the state received by the client when no encryption was
used. This comparison is carried out under the variation of the
amount of encryption noise for both no transmission loss and
loss corresponding to 10 km fiber propagation at a telecom
wavelength, equivalent to 5 dB transmission loss. This loss
is implemented with a half-wave plate and polarizing beam
splitter combination. The results are presented in Fig. 4b. The
variation of the fidelities, as was also observed for the dis-
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FIG. 4: Server implementing a squeezing gate. (a) Experimental setup. The squeezing gate was implemented by injecting the input states
into a squeezed-light source made of a potassium titanyl phosphate crystal in a linear cavity. After squeezing the output state was sent back to
the client who decrypted it by interfering the mode with another beam that was modulated with pi-phase shifted encryption noise at a 2 % tap-
off beam splitter. Due to squeezing the amplitude quadrature, the decryption noise was amplified differently in the two quadratures with gains
g1 and g2 depending on the squeezing strength. More details can be found in the supplementary material. (b) The fidelity between the output
states of the computation on encrypted and plain-text states with both 100 % channel transmission and 5 dB transmission loss corresponding
to optical loss in 10 km fiber at telecom wavelength. Statistical error bars are smaller than the point size. The variation of the fidelities comes
mainly from systematic errors in the fine tuning of the decryption and system drifts. (c-f) Reconstructed Wigner functions in phase space for
each step in the protocol with a coherent input state and the squeezing gate measured by homodyne detection after each step at a side-band
frequency of 10.5 MHz. The black circle in (f) denotes the FWHM of the ideal squeezing ellipse. (g) shows the signal-to-noise ratios in the
Q and P quadratures for the states shown in (c)-(f) as well as for an output state that was not encrypted during computation. The dashed lines
indicate the signal-to-noise ratio of an output state using an ideal gate and no channel loss.
6placement gates, comes mainly from systematic errors in the
fine tuning of the decryption and system drifts. The deviation
from unity fidelity is mainly caused by imperfect reconstruc-
tion of the Wigner functions, system drifts as well as non-ideal
decryption due to a small amount of decorrelation between
the encryption and decryption noise. Despite these imperfec-
tions, the fidelity is close to unity and stays above 98.5 % for
all parameters. In general the fidelities for the loss case are
a bit higher due to the fact that the loss forces the decrypted
states closer to the vacuum state. The measured high fidelities
show that performing quantum computing on encrypted states
rather than on plain-text states is indeed feasible.
To quantify the performance of the implemented remote
gate itself, we display in Fig. 4g the SNRs of the Q and P
quadratures for the different steps of the protocol. Ideally, i.e.
without channel loss, without loss in the gate and with per-
fect decryption, the squeezing gate will preserve the SNR as
indicated by the two dashed lines. For the output state we dis-
play the SNRs for both with and without encryption, showing
a small decrease in SNR if encryption is used. The remaining
reduction of the SNR in comparison to the ideal gate is mainly
due to optical loss, i.e. channel loss of 5 dB in each direction
and about 2.2 dB for the gate, including the squeezer and the
supply optics. A more detailed loss analysis can be found in
the supplementary material.
CONCLUSION
We have developed a continuous-variable protocol for
quantum computing on encrypted variables where we required
a baseline of only two uses of a quantum channel; one use for
the input and another for the output. We required one ad-
ditional round of classical communication in each direction
and one additional use of the quantum channel to implement
a cubic phase gate U3(T ), while Gaussian gates can be im-
plemented with no communication cost. The client need only
be capable of performing displacements to both encrypt and
decrypt, except when they perform a U3(T ) gate the client
must be capable of implementing a U2(A) gate as well. Al-
ternatively, one could run an equivalent entanglement-based
version of this protocol which relies on teleportation [23]. To
achieve high fidelity teleportation, one could use a hybrid tele-
portation scheme such as that of Ref. [24].
In this paper, we also studied how to compose gates for
encryption and decryption, the effects of transmission and im-
perfect encryption, an entanglement-based analogue, the use
of channel estimation as well as the limitations on squeez-
ing in the cubic phase gate. We have experimentally demon-
strated our scheme in performing both displacements and on-
line squeezing operations on an alphabet of coherent states
and studied the resulting performance in terms of the fi-
delity. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time quantum computing on encrypted data has been gen-
eralized to continuous variables, as well as the first proof-
of-principle demonstration of any form (qubit or qumode)
of secure delegated quantum computing over a lossy chan-
nel. Extending this protocol to long-distances will inevitably
require quantum-repeater technologies to preserve the en-
crypted states [25]. We hope our results will help lay the
ground work for future theoretical explorations and experi-
mental demonstrations like those for quantum key distribu-
tion, such as free-space and field demonstrations.
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Gate Decryption Operators
In this section we first define a set of continuous-variable gates as well as the following conventions.
[qˆ, pˆ] = i
X(Q) = exp(−iQpˆ)
Z(P ) = exp(iP qˆ)
Uk(T ) = exp(iT qˆ
k)
F = exp
[
ipi
4
(
qˆ2 + pˆ2
)]
CZ,12 = exp(iqˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2)
D(α) = exp(αaˆ† − α∗aˆ)
D(Q,P ) = e−
i
2QPZ(P )X(Q) for α =
1√
2
(Q+ iP )
|ψ〉L = D(Q,P )|ψ〉 (3)
Identities:
eXeY = exp{Y +
∞∑
n=1
1
n!
[X,Y ](n)}eX
[X,Y ](n) = [X, [X, [X, . . . , [X,Y ], . . . , ]]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−brackets
(4)
We define a encryption operation, D(Q,P ), consisting of a random displacement in phase space. We consider a universal set of
gatesG ∈ {X(Q), Z(P ), U2(T ), U3(T ), F, CZ,12}. We wish to demonstrate the existence of a correction operator, C(Q,P,G),
which depends on the encryption parameters and G such that C(Q,P,G)GD(Q,P )|ψ〉 = G|ψ〉.
Z(S)
X(Q)Z(S)X†(Q) = exp(−iQpˆ) exp(iSqˆ) exp(iQpˆ)
= exp(iSqˆ + [−iQpˆ, iSqˆ] + . . .)
= exp(iSqˆ − iQS)
⇒ X(Q)Z(S) = e−iQSZ(S)X(Q) (5)
8Correction:
Z(S)D(Q,P ) = Z(S)e−
i
2QPZ(P )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )Z(S)X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )eiQSX(Q)Z(S)
= C†(Q,P, S)Z(S)
C(Q,P, S) = exp[i(QP/2−QS)]X(−Q)Z(−P ) (6)
X(S)
Correction:
X(S)D(Q,P ) = X(S)e−
i
2QPZ(P )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QP e−iPSZ(P )X(S)X(Q) By (5)
= C†(Q,P, S)X(S)
C(Q,P, S) = exp[i(QP/2 + PS)]X(−Q)Z(−P ) (7)
U2(T )
X(Q)U2(T )X
†(Q) = exp(−iQpˆ) exp(iT qˆ2) exp(iQpˆ)
= exp(iT qˆ2 + [−iQpˆ, iT qˆ2] + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ2 − 2iQT qˆ + 1
2!
[−iQpˆ,−2iQT qˆ] + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ2 − 2iQT qˆ + 1
2
(2iQ2T ) + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ2 − 2iQT qˆ + iQ2T )
⇒ X(Q)U2(T ) = exp(iT qˆ2 − 2iQT qˆ + iQ2T )X(Q)
= eiQ
2TZ(−2QT )U2(T )X(Q) (8)
Correction:
U2(T )D(Q,P ) = U2(T )e
− i2QPZ(P )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )U2(T )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )e−iQ
2TZ(2QT )X(Q)U2(T )
= C†(Q,P, T )U2(T )
⇒ C(Q,P, T ) = exp[i(QP/2 +Q2T )]X(−Q)Z(−2QT )Z(−P ) (9)
9U3(T )
X(Q)U3(T )X
†(Q) = exp(−iQpˆ) exp(iT qˆ3) exp(iQpˆ)
= exp(iT qˆ3 + [−iQpˆ, iT qˆ3] + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ3 − 3iQT qˆ2 + 1
2!
[−iQpˆ,−3iQT qˆ2] + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ3 − 3iQT qˆ2 + 1
2!
(6iQ2T qˆ) +
1
3!
[−iQpˆ, 6iQ2T qˆ] + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ3 − 3iQT qˆ2 + 3iQ2T qˆ + 1
6
(−6iQ3T ) + . . .)
= exp(iT qˆ3 − 3iQT qˆ2 + 3iQ2T qˆ − iQ3T )
⇒ X(Q)U3(T ) = e−iQ3TZ(3Q2T )U2(−3QT )U3(T )X(Q) (10)
Correction:
U3(T )D(Q,P ) = U3(T )e
− i2QPZ(P )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )U3(T )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPZ(P )eiQ
3TU2(3QT )Z(−3Q2T )X(Q)U3(T )
= C†(Q,P, T )U3(T )
C(Q,P, T ) = exp[i(QP/2−Q3T )]X(−Q)Z(3Q2T )U2(−3QT )Z(−P ) (11)
However, U2(T ) does not slide nicely through F so we wish to have the server handle this correction on the fly.
U3(T )D(Q,P ) = exp[i(−QP/2 +Q3T )]U2(3QT )Z(P − 3Q2T )X(Q)U3(T )
(12)
|φ〉 • pˆ = m1
|0〉p • X(m1)F |φ〉
(13)
Let |φ〉 → F †U3(T )D(Q,P )|ψ〉 so that the output of the teleportation is given by
X(m1)U3(T )D(Q,P )|ψ〉
= exp[i(−QP/2 +Q3T )]X(m1)U2(3QT )Z(P − 3Q2T )X(Q)U3(T )|ψ〉. (14)
It is clear that applying the correction operator U2(−3QT )X(−m1) to this state would eliminate the appearance of U2, however
we cannot divulge the value of Q as this would compromise the security. Consider the circuit given by
F †U3(T )D(Q,P )|ψ〉 • pˆ = m1
|0〉p • X(−m1) U2(A) U2(B) Z(P − 3Q2T )X(Q)U3(T )|ψ〉
(15)
where A+B = −3QT . We can then slide U2(A) all the way to the left as
D(Q,P )|ψ〉 F †U3(T ) • pˆ = m1
U2(A)Z(Q2)|0〉p • Z(2m1A) X(−m1) U2(B)
(16)
where the output is given by Z(Q2)Z(2m1A)Z(P − 3Q2T )X(Q)U3(T )|ψ〉 and we also include another Z gate as part of the
preparation. If we choose A at ‘random’ then we are giving the server negligible information about the encryption parameter Q
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by telling them the value of B. Note that the server will also have to inform the client of m1 obtained so that they can correct
for the additional Z(2m1A) gate, and thus implementing this gate requires a single round of communication. Furthermore the
density operator corresponding to the state U2(A)Z(Q2)|0〉p when averaged over Q2 is proportional to the identity, and thus no
information about Q can be attained from the state itself. This can be seen from the fact that∫
dQ2 P (Q2) Z(Q2)|0〉p〈0|pZ†(Q2) =
∫
dQ2 P (Q2) |Q2〉p〈Q2|p
→
∫
dQ2 |Q2〉p〈Q2|p ∝ 1, (17)
if we choose Q2 according to some Gaussian probability density function, P (Q2), whose variance tends towards infinity.
CZ,12
CZ,12[X(Q)⊗ 1]C†Z,12 = exp(iqˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2)[exp(−iQpˆ1)⊗ 1] exp(−iqˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2)
= exp(iqˆ1qˆ2)[exp(−iQpˆ1)] exp(−iqˆ1qˆ2) Tensor structure implicit in subscripts
= exp(−iQpˆ1 + [iqˆ1qˆ2,−iQpˆ1] + . . .)
= exp(−iQpˆ1 + iQqˆ2)
= X1(Q)Z2(Q) (18)
CZ,12[X1(Q1)⊗X2(Q2)]C†Z,12 = CZ,12[(X1(Q1)⊗ 12)(11 ⊗X2(Q2)]C†Z,12
= CZ,12[(X1(Q1)⊗ 12)C†Z,12CZ,12(11 ⊗X2(Q2)]C†Z,12
= [X1(Q1)⊗ Z2(Q1)][Z1(Q2)⊗X2(Q2)]
= X1(Q1)Z1(Q2)⊗ Z2(Q1)X2(Q2)
⇒ CZ,12[X1(Q1)⊗X2(Q2)] = [X1(Q1)Z1(Q2)⊗ Z2(Q1)X2(Q2)]CZ,12 (19)
Correction:
CZ,12[D1(Q1, P1)⊗D2(Q2, P2)] = CZ,12e− i2 (Q1P1+Q2P2)[Z1(P1)X1(Q1)⊗ Z2(P2)X2(Q2)]
= e−
i
2 (Q1P1+Q2P2)[Z1(P1)⊗ Z2(P2)]CZ,12[X1(Q1)⊗X2(Q2)]
= e−
i
2 (Q1P1+Q2P2)[Z1(P1)⊗ Z2(P2)][X1(Q1)Z1(Q2)⊗ Z2(Q1)X2(Q2)]CZ,12
= e−
i
2 (Q1P1+Q2P2)[Z1(P1)X1(Q1)Z1(Q2)⊗ Z2(P2)Z2(Q1)X2(Q2)]CZ,12
= C†(Q1, P1, Q2, P2)CZ,12
C(Q1, P1, Q2, P2) = e
i
2 (Q1P1+Q2P2)[Z1(−Q2)X1(−Q1)Z1(−P1)⊗X2(−Q2)Z2(−Q1)Z2(−P2)] (20)
F
FZ(P )F † = X(−P )
FX(Q)F † = Z(Q)
FD(Q,P ) = Fe−
i
2QPZ(P )X(Q)
= e−
i
2QPFZ(P )F †FX(Q)F †F
= e−
i
2QPX(−P )Z(Q)F
= C†(Q,P )F
C(Q,P ) = e
i
2QPZ(−Q)X(P ) (21)
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Equivalence of the Squeezing Gate
To demonstrate more than simply shifts in phase space, we implemented a squeezing operation, S(r) = exp(r(aˆ2 − aˆ†2)/2),
in the experiment. To see why this squeezing operation is as challenging as the U2(T ) gate which is required for universal
computation, simply notice that it is equivalent up to rotations U2(T ) = R(θ)S(r)R(φ) [22] where R(θ) = exp(iθaˆ†aˆ) is
generated by the free Hamiltonian. To compose gates, these additional phase shifts must be performed by the server, however to
demonstrate a single U2(T ) gate one can notice the following
C†(α, T )U2(T )D(α)|ψ〉 = C†(α, T )R(θ)S(r)R(φ)D(α)|ψ〉
= C˜†(α, T, θ)S(r)R(φ) exp(αaˆ† − α∗aˆ)R†(φ)R(φ)|ψ〉
= C˜†(α, T, θ)S(r) exp(αeiφaˆ† − α∗e−iφaˆ)R(φ)|ψ〉
= C˜†(α, T, θ)S(r)D(α˜) [R(φ)|ψ〉] . (22)
We have defined a modified decryption operator C˜†(α, T, θ) = C†(α, T )R(θ), reinterpreted the phase reference for the input
state |ψ〉 → R(φ)|ψ〉, and the encryption parameter has simply changed via α˜ = αeiφ. A similar trick can be used to shift the
rotation R(θ) through the decryption operator, which is only some displacement, to show that C˜†(α, T, θ) = R(θ)C†(α, T, θ)
for some displacement C. Thus up to an appropriate redefinition of the initial and final phase references, implementation of a
squeezing operation S(r) is sufficient to demonstrate a U2(T ) gate.
Compositions of Gates
To implement a single gate from the universal set defined above, we have demonstrated that there exists a correction (decryp-
tion) operator, CG, that satisfies
CˆGGˆDˆ(Q,P )|ψ〉 = Gˆ|ψ〉, (23)
and similarly for the two-qumode CZ,12 gate. We would like the server to be able to compose gates without needing the client
to decrypt (or correct) between applications. Namely we wish to demonstrate that
Cˆ ′Gˆ2Gˆ1Dˆ(Q,P )|ψ〉 = Gˆ2Gˆ1|ψ〉, (24)
or that the client can update their correction operator while only requiring possibly classical communication with the server.
Suppose that
Cˆ1Gˆ1Dˆ(Q,P )|ψ〉 = Gˆ1|ψ〉
Cˆ2Gˆ2Dˆ(Q,P )|ψ〉 = Gˆ2|ψ〉, (25)
can we construct a Cˆ ′ from our knowledge of Cˆ1,2? Notice that for all of the gates in the universal set the decryption operators,
C, involve (up to a phase) only products of operators from the set C ∈ {X(Q), Z(P )}; aside from the special case of U3(T )
discussed above. Suppose G ∈ {X(Q), Z(P ), U2(T ), U3(T ), F, CZ,12} we would like to show that there exists a modified
decryption operator C ′ such that
C ′G = GD(Q,P )C (26)
so that we can slide a new correction through the gate as
C ′1G2G1D(Q,P )|ψ〉 = [G2D(Q,P )C1]G1D(Q,P )|ψ〉
= G2D(Q,P )[C1G1D(Q,P )]|ψ〉
= G2D(Q,P )G1|ψ〉
⇒ C2C ′1G2G1D(Q,P ) = C2G2D(Q,P )G1|ψ〉
= G2G1|ψ〉. (27)
Notice first that gates, G, with Hamiltonians involving only powers of qˆ slide trivially through each other. The only correction
operator, in {X(Q), Z(P )}, that does not involve powers of only qˆ is precisely X(Q). But we have already shown how to
rewrite
C ′G = GX(Q), (28)
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it is easy to insert the extra displacement D(Q,P ) between the two terms in the RHS of the above equation since Z(P ), X(Q)
easily slide through all elements G as illustrated in the above work. Also note for the case where G = X(Q) and C involving
powers of qˆ we can apply the same identities by shifting the extra terms to the other side. By recursively applying the identities
to swap orderings by applying new corrections we can not only slide the gate through the encryption operation, we can also slide
corrections through other gates. In this manner we can build up more complicated gates, with no communication between the
client and server for Gaussian gates and one additional round of communication for U3.
Effect of Transmission
To consider the action of each step of the protocol on our state we move to the Wigner function representation; this is conve-
nient as all operations of interest are linear transformations in the canonical operations qˆ, pˆ and thus are simple transformations
of the associated Wigner function. We model the loss as a beamsplitter B12(t)
B12(t) =
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)
, (29)
where the transmission (reflection) factor is given by t = cos θ (r = sin θ). This is associated with the input-output relations(
q′1
q′2
)
= B12(t)
(
q1
q2
)
, (30)
and similarly for p1,2. When subjecting our mode of interest to loss we inject the vacuum state,Wvac(q, p) = 1/pi exp(−q2−p2),
in the spare port of the beam splitter. We can study the effect of loss in comparison to the ideal case by integrating over the
loss modes and calculating the fidelity between the resulting Wigner function and the one that would be obtained in the absence
of loss. If the initial state is a coherent state, |α〉, then these steps lead to the transformation |α〉 → ∣∣t2α+ tβ〉 where β is
the displacement provided by the server, the general case is presented in II. The symmetric case, where the encryption and the
server’s displacement are distributed according to a Gaussian probability distribution function with zero mean and variance ∆2,
is plotted in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 5: Average fidelity between |〈α + β|t2α + tβ〉|2 for an initial coherent state subject to the protocol with and without loss, which
corresponds to a channel with transmission factor t. Both α and β are distributed according to Gaussians with zero mean and variance ∆2.
Imperfect Encryption
To encrypt a state we used the fact that randomly shifting the initial state in phase space results in the maximally mixed state
X(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 1
pi
∫
D(α)|ψ〉〈ψ|D†(α)d2α = 1. (31)
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Step Operation Transformation
Initial W (q1, p1)
Encryption D1(Q,P ) W (q1 −Q, p1 − P )
Loss W (q1 −Q, p1 − P )Wvac(q2, p2)
B12(t) W (t(q1 −Q) + rq2, t(p1 − P ) + rp2)×
Wvac(−r(q1 −Q) + tq2,−r(p1 − P ) + tp2)
Server D1(A,B) W (q′1 −A, p′1 −B)Wvac(q′2, p′2)
Loss W (q′1 −A, p′1 −B)Wvac(q′2, p′2)Wvac(q3, p3)
B13(t) W (t(q
′
1 −A) + rq3, t(p′1 −B) + rp3)Wvac(q′2, p′2)Wvac(−r(q′1 −A) + tq3,−r(p1 −A′) + tp3)
Decryption D1(−t2Q,−t2P ) W (t2q1 − tA+ trq2 + rq3, t2p1 − tB + trp2 + rp3)Wvac(q′2, p′2)Wvac(q′3, p′3)
TABLE II: The transformations induced by the protocol in the framework of the Wigner function, where we have limited the server to simply
applying a displacement. The calculation for U2(T ) proceeds in a similar fashion, but U3(T ) does not have a linear transformation in terms of
the operators qˆ, pˆ and would be more complicated to calculate in this fashion.
To see why this is true, notice that D(β) provides an irreducible representation, up to a phase, of the Heisenberg-Weyl group.
Furthermore, the operator X commutes with D(β) and hence by Schur’s Lemma, for unitary groups, X ∝ 1. Using the fact
that |ψ〉 is normalized it is easy to show that the constant of proportionality is 1, and thus we have the relationship. From a
physical point of view it is not possible to apply a random displacement over R2 as this would require infinite energy; from
a mathematical perspective it’s not clear what a ‘random’ displacement over R2 even means. Instead we consider applying a
displacement that is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance ∆2 which follows the mapping
X(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 1
2pi∆2
∫
D(α)|ψ〉〈ψ|D†(α)e− |α|
2
2∆2 d2α. (32)
The finite width of the Gaussian will lead to this state differing from the maximally mixed state; in general the resulting state
will depend on the initial state. A simple figure of merit we can study is the purity of the state Trρ2, in discrete variable systems
the purity is always greater than 1/d but in continuous variable systems the purity can be zero, as is the case for the maximally
mixed state. We can find the purity of an arbitrary initial state, ρ → W (α), subject to the map X(|ψ〉〈ψ|) by working in the
Wigner function formalism
W (α)→W (α′) = 1
2pi∆2
∫
W (α− β)e− |β|
2
2∆2 d2β
Trρ2 = 2pi
∫
W (α′)2d2α′. (33)
Note that this transformation is also just the convolution of our initial Wigner function with a Gaussian probability distribution.
We can then use the purity to characterize how well our encryption operation simulates the ideal encryption procedure, given a
particular class of input states. Consider the case where our initial state is also a coherent state, given by |α〉
X(|α〉〈α|) = 1
2pi∆2
∫
D(β)|α〉〈α|D†(β)e− |β|
2
2∆2 d2β
=
1
2pi∆2
∫
|α+ β〉〈α+ β|e− |β|
2
2∆2 d2β
=
1
2pi∆2
∫
|γ〉〈γ|e− |γ−α|
2
2∆2 d2γ. (34)
Note that a thermal state ρth(n¯) of average excitation number n¯ has Glauber-Sudarshan representation given by
ρth(n¯) =
1
pin¯
∫
|α〉〈α|e− |α|
2
n¯ d2α. (35)
Thus we have that X(|α〉〈α|) corresponds to a thermal state with n¯ = 2∆2 which is displaced by an amount α. For a fixed
amount of energy, thermal states maximize their Von Neumann entropy S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ) which is also related to purity; S(ρ)
is maximized by the maximally mixed state and is zero for pure states. The purity of ρth(n¯) can be calculated as Tr(ρth(n¯)2) =
1/(1 + 2n¯) so that the purity of X(|α〉〈α|) is given by 1/(1 + 4∆2).
In general one can use the Wigner function to evaluate the action of the encryption and to determine how mixed the resulting
state is. In Fig. 6 we show the action of imperfect encryption on the vacuum state and in Fig. 7 we show the same for a squeezed
vacuum state. In general, we want the Gaussian envelope to be large enough to smear out any details about the set of possible
initial states.
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FIG. 6: (a) The Wigner function corresponding to the vacuum state. (b) The Wigner function after the vacuum is encrypted where ∆ = 2; this
corresponds to a thermal state with n¯ = 8.
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FIG. 7: (a) The Wigner function for a squeezed vacuum state with squeezing parameter r = ln 2. (b,c,d) The Wigner function after the
squeezed state is encrypted with parameter ∆ = 1, 2, 3 respectively. Notice that for small ∆ the encrypted state is asymmetric, which gives us
some information about the initial state, but for higher values the plot more closely resembles a thermal state. The purity of the resulting states
(a-d) are ≈ 1, 0.27, 0.10, 0.05 respectively.
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Entanglement-Based Analogy
One can exploit the well-known equivalence between preparing a coherent state, chosen according to a Gaussian distribution,
and performing Heterodyne detection on half of an EPR pair to show an analogous entanglement-based encryption scheme.
In conventional CV teleportation [21], where the parties share a perfectly squeezed EPR pair, the final correction operator is
precisely a displacement. Using the principle of deferred measurement, where we simply wait to perform the two homodyne
measurements until after the state has been returned from the server, it is clear that the server could not have known of the
measurement outcomes and hence the encryption parameters. This analogy works only in the limit of infinite squeezing; in
the realistic scenario of finite squeezing there is excess noise introduced onto the mode of interest and the entanglement-based
scheme is not a perfect analogy. However, in the limit of large squeezing, or equivalently a Gaussian distribution with large
variance, the excess noise tends to zero and this is a good approximation to the actual implementation.
One can also show that the interactive U3(T ) gate has an entanglement-based equivalent. First note that,
U2,b(A)|EPR〉 ∝ U2,b(A)
∫
dq|q〉a|q〉b
∝
∫
dqeiAq
2
∫
dpe−iqp|q〉a|p〉b. (36)
If we now measure the second mode and obtain an outcome P we have the following,
→
∫
dqeiAq
2
e−iqP |q〉a
= U2,a(A)
∫
dqe−iqP |q〉a
∝ U2(A)Z(−P )|0〉p. (37)
Thus we can use the above procedure to modify the implementation of U3(T ) and defer the final measurement to construct an
entanglement-based version. Explicitly, the client can implement U2(A) on half of an EPR pair, shared with the server, before
measuring the pˆ quadrature; this will have the same effect as the previous scheme. As before, this holds in an exact sense only
in the unphysical limit of perfect squeezing.
Channel Estimation
When accounting for loss, as seen in II, we require the displacement D(−t2Q,−t2P ) as part of the correction. To perform
this displacement we must know the transmission coefficient t, however we could forgo this stipulation and assume that t ≈ 1,
but doing so will result in a reduced fidelity. In order to partially correct for loss it is necessary to do parameter estimation on
the channel. This can be done, for example, by periodically sending random coherent states and asking the server to apply some
random displacement, after which one can measure the state in order to learn information about the loss parameter. Generally,
there will also be additional noise that one can not correct for as well, but if desired one can estimate the magnitude of this noise
by sending an appropriate ensemble of initial states. By doing this frequently enough one can ensure that the channel is not
varying appreciably with time, and if so to adjust the necessary correction.
This process ensures that the server is not maliciously altering the channel parameters, in fact we can take this notion one step
further and check that the server is indeed performing the desired displacement thus verifying the X,Z operations in our full
calculation. In the original proposal for blind quantum computation, the ability to verify that the server is performing the desired
calculation arises from the capability of hiding the gates that one is performing. Through doing so one is able to periodically
perform a check by doing an easy computation of which one already knows the answer. Since the server is unable to discriminate
this check from the actual computation it is unable to pass the check without operating faithfully. In our case the server is fully
aware of all gates being performed and could for example perform all operations except U3(T ) as intended. Fortunately, there is
a large class of desirable computations for which there exist efficient classical verification methods and so one is able to detect
an incorrect answer with classical post-processing.
We show the advantage of accounting for the loss in the channel by comparing the fidelities to the ideal state both with and
without taking into account the loss parameter in Fig. 8.
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FIG. 8: (a) Average fidelity between |〈α + β|t2α + tβ〉|2 for an initial coherent state subject to the protocol with and without loss, which
corresponds to a channel with transmission factor t. (b) The same plot as in part (a) but where the final displacement does not take into account
the channel loss t, given by |〈α+ β|t2α+ tβ〉+ (t2− 1)γ|2, where γ is the encryption parameter. All of α, β and γ are distributed according
to Gaussians with zero mean and variance ∆2.
Limitations on U2(T )
Suppose we wish to decompose U2(Xtot) = U2(Xin)U2(Xenc) as the sum of two partsXtot = Xin +Xenc, as in the case where
we split the operator U2(−3QT ) between the client and server in order to implement U3(T ). Furthermore, assume that we do
not want the knowledge of Xenc to reveal the value of Xtot. To attempt to hide the value of Xtot, we choose Xin to be a random
variable of zero mean and variance Vin. One method of characterizing the amount of information that a random variable carries
about a parameter upon which its probability distribution depends on is with the Fisher information, given by
IX(θ) = E
[(
∂
∂θ
logP (X; θ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣θ
]
. (38)
Explicitly, in the case where Xtot = −3QT , the Fisher information for Xenc has the property that I(Q) ∝ T 2/Vin. Notice that
as Vin → 0 the Fisher information increases without bound indicating that Xenc allows one to make a very good estimate of the
encryption parameterQ. However, when Vin →∞ then Fisher information approaches zero and the server learns no information
of the encryption parameter.
Measuring encryption efficiency
A shot-noise limited laser at 1064 nm generated a highly coherent beam, which was split into two. One part was designated
as a local oscillator (LO), the other as the signal beam. A sketch of the setup is shown in Fig. 9.
The local oscillator was sent directly to the detection stage, while the signal beam was passed through a set of optical modula-
tors, to be modulated in the phase and amplitude quadratures. The electronic input to the modulators in either quadrature was an
addition of two signals, one representing the alphabet of the different input states of the client, the other the client’s encryption
noise. The noise was determined to be white within the measurement bandwidth of 1 MHz. The alphabet was recorded by the
data acquisition to establish the size of the correlations. The homodyne detector output was demodulated at 10.5 MHz, with a
1 MHz lowpass filter to set the measurement bandwidth. The sampling rate was 5 MHz, with 14 bit resolution. The variance
of the Gaussian distributed input state alphabet was Vin = 0.6 SNU. From the measured data we determined the variances and
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FIG. 9: A schematic representation of the encryption efficiency experiment. PD: Photo diode. DAQ: Data acquisition.
covariances which give an estimate for the mutual information by the formula,
I(serverenc : clientin) =
1
2
log2
(
Vin
Vin − C2V
)
, (39)
where C is the covariance between the recorded alphabet and the signal, and V = Vin + Venc, i.e. the variance of the signal and
the encryption.
Displacement gates
A shot-noise limited laser at 1064 nm generated a highly coherent beam, which was split into two. One part was designated
as a local oscillator (LO), the other as the signal beam. A sketch of the setup is shown in Fig. 10.
The local oscillator was sent directly to the detection stage, while the signal beam was passed through a set of optical modu-
lators, to be modulated in the phase and amplitude quadratures. The electronic input to the modulators in either quadrature was
an addition of two noise signals, one representing the alphabet of the different input states of the client, the other the client’s
encryption noise. The noise signals were determined to be white within the measurement bandwidth of 1 MHz. The state then
passed through a half-wave plate and polarizing beam splitter combination which simulated an attenuation t from the client to
the server.
Then the state was further displaced by the server, with another signal representing the alphabet of a simple linear gate.
Like the previous modulations the displacement signal was also white within the measurement bandwidth. The state was then
attenuated with another polarizing beam splitter and a half-wave plate, with a setting identical to the first. This was done to
simulate a state experiencing the same loss on the return trip from the server to the client. Following this final loss simulation,
the state was modulated again by the client, to eliminate the encryption noise. This elimination was possible down to less
than 0.2 SNU in both quadratures. This was in part made possible due to a custom-made noise generator with extremely
well correlated outputs at the relevant frequencies. To obtain the right phase between the noise modulation and the cancelling
modulation, a controllable phase delay between the modulations was also introduced, by using a DB64 Coax Delay Box from
Stanford Research Systems from the noise generator to the modulator. The state was then interfered with the local oscillator at
a 50/50 beam splitter, with the output modes subsequently detected by PIN photo diodes with a quantum efficiency of 90 %.
The visibility of the interference was 92 %, due to the distortion of the spatial beam profile by the many modulators. Obtaining
this visibility was made easier by introducing a cavity to which both the signal and the local oscillator were matched, to ensure
efficient overlap despite the spatial distortions.
Two types of measurements were made. The first type was where the relative phase of the local oscillator with the signal
was continuously scanned by a slow function generator at 5 Hz. The outputs of the two photo detectors were subtracted and
mixed down to DC using a strong electronic local oscillator at 10.5 MHz. The output of the mixer was amplified and low-pass
filtered at 1 MHz before being sent to a data acquisition card (DAC) where the voltages were sampled with a rate of 5 MHz.
Digitally a 10 kHz high-pass filter was implemented to dampen a strong 50 Hz modulation originating from the AC line, which
was detrimental to the quality of the state reconstruction. The measurements were used to reconstruct the density matrices and
Wigner functions of the input and output states using a maximum likelihood algorithm [26] and the Python module QuTiP [27].
The first measurements were used to estimate the fidelity of the decryption operation relative to an unencrypted state going
through the gate and the channel, applying the definition of fidelity [15],
F = Tr
(√√
ρ0ρ1
√
ρ0
)
, (40)
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FIG. 10: A schematic representation of the displacement gate experiment.
to the reconstructed density matrices. The different Wigner functions are shown in Fig. 11a and b.
The second type of measurement had the relative phase locked such that the phase quadrature was measured. Here the
subtracted photo detector signals were sent to a spectrum analyzer (SA), which monitored the signal strength using a zero span
trace at 10.5 MHz. This was done to easily monitor the variance of the applied Gaussian noise modulations. Though this
variance was only monitored in the phase quadrature, the state reconstruction was done on-line to ensure generation of states
with approximately symmetric variances. The estimation of the residual noise can be seen in Figure 11c.
Squeezing gate
A shot-noise limited laser at 1064 nm generated a highly coherent beam, which was split into three. One part was designated
as a local oscillator (LO), the second as the signal beam, and the third as the decryption beam. A sketch of the setup is shown in
Fig. 12.
The signal beam was modulated with a single displacement in Q and P , and in addition a noise modulation generated by a
noise generator. Another output of each of the noise generators, highly correlated with the first, was connected to the corre-
sponding modulators in the decryption path. The signal beam then encountered a half-wave plate and polarizing beam splitter
combination to simulate the channel, and was then forwarded through a Faraday rotator and another half-wave plate to ensure
that the light was mostly in the s-polarization before entering the squeezing cavity. The light entered the resonant linear semi-
monolithic cavity containing the 1× 2× 10 mm3 periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate crystal pumped with a 532 nm
pump beam of 7 mW through the coupling mirror. The outer crystal face was coated to have a high reflectivity of 99.95 % for both
wavelengths, while a curved mirror with a radius of curvature of 20 mm, a reflectivity of 90 % for the fundamental wavelength
at 1064 nm and a reflectivity of 20 % for the pump wavelength served as a piezo-tunable coupling mirror. The crystal was kept
at a phase matching temperature of 36.2 ◦C , and most of the signal returned from where it entered, towards the Faraday rotator,
but having been squeezed by performing round trips in the cavity. Before hitting the Faraday rotator, a beam sampler redirected
2 % of the light for generating an error signal for cavity and pump phase locking. Because the squeezing cavity was birefringent,
the small p-polarization component was used to generate an error signal with the Ha¨nsch-Couillaud locking technique [28]. The
phase of the pump beam with respect to the signal beam was locked using a phase modulation of the signal beam at 36.7 MHz
generated using the phase modulator used for encrypted input state generation.
After entering the Faraday rotator from the other direction, the beam was now reflected, rather than transmitted, on the
polarizing beam splitter. It then went through a half-wave plate and polarizing beam splitter combination with the same setting
as the initial one, to simulate identical channels to and from the server. It was then interfered with the decryption beam on another
beam sampler, to minimize loss to the signal. The two beams were locked to destructive interference by another sideband lock,
using the same 36.7 MHz sideband, with a photodiode monitoring the interference fringes in the secondary output port of the
beam sampler. The offset on this error signal allowed for optimizing the relative phase between the beams, and this, in addition
to the adjustable gain settings for the correlated outputs, made it possible to cancel the encryption modulation very accurately.
Following the decryption operation the signal was interfered with the local oscillator for scanned homodyne detection for density
matrix reconstruction. Data acquisition was the same as for the displacement gate experiment. To compute the fidelity the
definition in Equation (40) was used. To reconstruct the encrypted states, which are highly thermal with a slowly decaying
photon distribution, a maximum likelihood algorithm which requires a truncation of the Fock space of the density matrix is
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FIG. 11: The effect of encryption and decryption on the computed data. (a,b) Reconstructed Wigner functions of the ensembles of coherent
states representing the output states, i.e. the input state (Vin = 0.3 SNU) after the gate operation (Vgate = 0.6 SNU). (a) Without encrypting
the data and (b) with encryption (Venc = 31 SNU). (c) Plot of the residual noise of the decryption process as a function of transmission. The
solid line is a theory curve of the residual noise versus transmission calculated by starting with the measured residual noise value of the ideal
channel (T = 100 %). The data was recorded with a spectrum analyser measuring zero-span around 10.5 MHz with a resolution bandwidth of
300 kHz and a video bandwidth of 30 Hz. The size of the error bars is due to the standard deviation of the 1000 recorded points.
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FIG. 12: A schematic representation of the squeezing gate experiment.
not feasible. Instead the Wigner function was obtained directly from the data with the help of the inverse Radon transform
and the filtered back-projection algorithm [26]. For states of smaller magnitude where one can justify the truncation of the
density matrix, the maximum likelihood algorithm is far superior [26]. A plot of the scanned squeezing, obtained by homodyne
detection, is shown in Fig. 13.
We here list the factors contributing to optical loss in the system. Firstly, the mode matching of the input beam into the
squeezer was 97 %. This was partly because of a very high sensitivity to the focus of the incoming beam, but also because,
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FIG. 13: Variance of the squeezed state used for the quantum gate, with a scanned local oscillator. The green trace represents shotnoise.
as mentioned, the Ha¨nsch-Couillaud lock required some deviation from the ideal polarization. This intentional misalignment
directly translated into loss of squeezing. Secondly, the reflected squeezed beam encountered a beam sampler, which directly
produced 2 % of transmission loss, but was necessary for the locking scheme, as the pump phase error signal was not sufficiently
strong in the transmission of the squeezing cavity. Further, the Ha¨nsch-Couillaud lock clearly only works in reflection. The
Faraday rotator induced 3 % loss, and the beam sampler for interfering the signal with the decryption beam produced another 2
% of loss. Lastly, the visibility of the homodyne detection was above 98 % and the photodiodes in the homodyne detector both
had a quantum efficiency of 99 %.
